Authoritarian governments have long relied on a blunt but effective tool to silence dissent: switching off the internet. From nationwide blackouts during elections to targeted throttling of social media platforms during protests, cutting connectivity has become a depressingly familiar tactic across parts of Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

A recent Reuters report on Iran’s escalating battle with Starlink highlights why that playbook is starting to fray. Tehran has spent years perfecting censorship and surveillance, yet it now finds itself struggling to contain a satellite-based internet service designed explicitly to bypass terrestrial controls.

Starlink terminals, smuggled into the country and powered by a constellation of low-Earth orbit satellites, are giving activists, journalists and ordinary citizens a way around state-imposed blackouts. The Iranian authorities are responding with jamming, criminal penalties and diplomatic pressure – but the genie is out of the bottle.

The question for the rest of the world is whether the rapid proliferation of satellite broadband services will make it fundamentally more difficult for authoritarian regimes to censor the internet and suppress political dissent.

Across Africa, internet shutdowns have become almost routine, particularly during elections. Uganda’s election last week is only the latest reminder. Once again, authorities restricted access to social media and messaging platforms amid fears of protests and unrest. Similar tactics have been deployed in recent years in Ethiopia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Senegal and elsewhere. The logic is that if citizens cannot communicate, organise or broadcast abuses to the outside world, protests are easier to contain.

For years, governments could enforce these shutdowns by leaning on a small number of mobile and fixed-line operators that control national networks. Licensing conditions, spectrum allocations and the threat of regulatory retaliation ensured compliance. Even when virtual private networks offered partial workarounds, they still depended on domestic infrastructure that could be throttled or disabled.

Relatively expensive

Low-Earth orbit satellite broadband changes that equation. Services like SpaceX’s Starlink, Amazon Leo, OneWeb and China’s emerging constellations are designed to deliver high-speed connectivity directly to user terminals, bypassing national fibre backbones and mobile towers entirely. Once a terminal is powered up and has a clear view of the sky, the state’s traditional choke points lose much of their power to control and censor.

This does not mean authoritarian control disappears overnight. Iran’s experience shows that governments will adapt. Jamming satellite signals, criminalising possession of terminals and pressuring neighbouring countries to restrict ground stations are all tools at their disposal. Satellite broadband is also still relatively expensive and logistically challenging to deploy at scale, particularly in low-income communities.

Read: Digital authoritarianism grows as African states normalise internet blackouts

But the terminals are getting cheaper, smaller and more power efficient. And, as multiple constellations come online, the cost and complexity of enforcing a total blackout will rise sharply. Shutting down the internet will increasingly require not just domestic coercion but sustained technical warfare against space-based systems.

For African governments that have grown accustomed to flipping the off switch during moments of political stress, this represents a profound shift. In the medium term, satellite broadband could act as a deterrent against blanket shutdowns by making them less effective and more internationally visible. Citizens who can remain connected are better able to document abuses, coordinate peacefully and attract global attention.

Yet this emerging freedom comes with uncomfortable trade-offs. Today the most prominent and widely deployed satellite broadband provider is Starlink, controlled by Elon Musk. Musk has positioned Starlink as a champion of free expression, particularly in conflict zones and repressive states. At the same time, he is an openly political actor with clear ideological leanings, including sympathy for far-right causes and a demonstrated willingness to intervene personally in geopolitical disputes.

Recent years have shown that Musk is not a neutral infrastructure provider. Decisions about where Starlink operates, under what conditions and at what price are ultimately his to make. In Ukraine, he has been accused of limiting Starlink’s availability for certain military uses.

For countries seeking to reduce dependence on authoritarian-friendly telecoms monopolies, replacing them with dependence on a single, capricious billionaire is hardly an unalloyed victory. Communications infrastructure is too critical to be left at the discretion of any one individual or company, no matter how rhetorically committed they appear to openness.

The answer is not to block satellite broadband – that would only entrench censorship – but to diversify it. Governments that genuinely care about digital resilience and freedom of expression should be licensing as many satellite broadband operators as possible, including Starlink. Encouraging competition between Starlink, Amazon Leo, OneWeb and future entrants reduces the risk that any single provider can become a point of failure or leverage.

A competitive satellite ecosystem also strengthens sovereignty in a more meaningful way. Rather than asserting control through shutdowns and censorship, states can ensure redundancy, affordability, and continuity of service through competitive markets and clear, transparent regulation. Diversity of providers makes it harder for external actors, whether authoritarian states or private tycoons, to dictate terms.

Balance of power

Satellite broadband will not end repression or censorship on its own. Authoritarian regimes will continue to arrest activists, pass restrictive laws and deploy surveillance technologies. But it does shift the balance of power in subtle, important ways. The ability to communicate, even imperfectly, undermines the effectiveness of blanket shutdowns as a tool of control.

Read: Starlink, Musk face rising political resistance in South Africa

As Uganda’s election and Iran’s confrontation with Starlink both illustrate, the age of easy internet blackouts is ending. The challenge now is to ensure that the skies above us do not become just another arena of concentrated power, but a genuinely open layer of global connectivity. – © 2026 NewsCentral Media